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SERIES ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

DATE: August 22, 1972

SUBJECT : GKR Efforts in the Countryside

REF : Phnom Penh-5417

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Transmitted as the sole enclosure to this airgram is an English translation of a paper in French prepared by the Embassy in response to a request by senior FANK staff officer, Major General Thongvan Fanmuong. This paper was handed to General Fanmuong on August 18, 1972.

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Enclosure to A- 132

"Liberation and Nation Building"

What is "Pacification"?

The word "pacification" as used in Vietnam covers a wide range of governmental programs aimed at winning and retaining the loyalty and cooperation of the population. The expression employed by Marshal Lon Nol "liberation and nation-building" expresses better perhaps these goals and appears better suited to current conditions in Cambodia.

First, it should be emphasized that the programs subsumed under the title "pacification" cannot individually or together replace actions to assure the security of a region. On the contrary, they should be considered as complementary to military action. Recent events in South Vietnam illustrate this fact. Pacification programs did not prevent the communists from establishing firm control over the population in the regions they invaded. On the other hand, pacification programs were unhindered by communist propaganda or other non-military enemy actions in the regions protected by South Vietnamese forces. The creation of territorial forces and reaction forces should thus be considered as prerequisites for "pacification" programs.

Among the programs that the Vietnamese have placed in the "pacification" category are:

1. In the military sector -
 - a. Popular Forces, a type of full-time militia, lightly armed, stationed near their homes, and drawing only partial pay;
 - b. the Peoples' Self-Defense Force, a type of militia, lightly armed, not full-time and not paid. They have also been used as a vehicle for information programs;
 - c. the rallier program (Chieu Hoi).

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2. In the social sector -

- a. assistance programs for refugees and war victims;
- b. community development;
- c. village self-development programs, which provide funds for projects developed by the villages themselves;
- d. armed forces civic action;
- e. an urban development program;
- f. psychological operations serving the goals of all the programs cited above.

Choosing Among These Programs.

The programs set forth above do not constitute a list of what should be done but a partial list of what can be done to win the loyalty and cooperation of the population. These programs reach down to the very roots of a society and are therefore more affected by cultural factors than any other government programs. Consequently, instead of observing what has been done in other countries, it would perhaps be better to begin with an inventory of what has been done and is being done in Cambodia in this field, either at the national or at the province level. This inventory might be followed by an objective evaluation of the value of each program. The Khmer Government, for example, has now had two years of experience with a community development program. A questioning of the community development workers, provincial officials, and villagers might show where this program has succeeded and where it has failed. In this manner one might learn whether changes or additional resources can promise greater success. Similarly, a comparison of the auto-defense plans and experiences of different provinces (we understand twelve have developed plans) might produce very valuable information.

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As for new programs, it would perhaps be better to begin with small pilot projects in order to judge their potential value before committing significant resources. Because the close cooperation of the local population is essential for the success of each of these programs, it would be best in some cases to leave to the provinces themselves the initiative of developing programs to fit local conditions. Indonesia recently followed this course of "regional self-development" with some success.

Direction and Coordination of Programs.

Pacification programs extend over almost the entire range of governmental functions. Many ministries and departments are consequently involved with them. To assure the most economic distribution of resources among these government agencies and to avoid duplication of effort, a central body would seem necessary. The Vietnamese Government established a Central Council of Pacification and Development, which brings together representatives of all organizations having programs in this field. Needless to say, the coordination of programs affecting the basic interests of several ministries requires that this body be headed by a director with uncontestable authority. (President Thieu is the Director of the Vietnamese Council and has delegated day-to-day operating authority to General Hon. Members of the Council are for the most part ministers.) We recommend that President Lon Nol himself head such a body and choose a prestigious deputy to handle its day-to-day affairs. It will also, of course, be necessary to provide this Council with adequate funding.

Although a strong, central body is necessary to coordinate these programs, experience has shown that overcentralization of planning and operations can kill rather than stimulate local initiative and cause the Government to overlook important regional differences affecting the success of these programs. In Cambodia's case, perhaps the best solution would be to place the day-to-day operating authority over these programs in the hands of provincial governors. Being for the most part commanders

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Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the number of correct responses. The number of correct responses was significantly higher for the 10-trial condition than for the 5-trial condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

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of military regions or sub-districts as well as governors, they can more easily assure that these programs are adapted to the local security situation and are complementary to military operations. In order to avoid the need to maintain contact with several ministers, the governors should have at the national level a single contact, the director of the Central Council or his delegate.

Local participation is also important in the recruiting and training of cadres for such specialized programs as community development. In some cases it may be preferable to recruit cadres locally, send them to a training center, and return them to their native provinces instead of employing career civil servants in these positions.

Immediate Steps to be Taken

1. Establish a Central Council under the President assisted by a deputy and composed of those ministers (or their representatives) having an important role in this field. This Council should have a limited but competent staff armed with full authority.

2. Initiate (a) an inventory of existing programs and of available resources as well as (b) a study of new projects to be undertaken. LENA files and provincial auto-defense plans could serve as points of departure.

3. Work out an overall plan.

As soon as this plan is established (preferably before the beginning of October), the American Government will be willing to consider what assistance it might be able to furnish the liberation and nation-building programs. (Communications equipment is a possibility.)

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